Friday, July 15, 2011

'Toontime: Asleep at the Wheel

[credit: Kevin Siers, Charlotte Observer]
One of the underlying reasons the Fukushima disaster is so severe, is the collusive relationship between the regulated utility and government regulators. But that is not only the case in Japan. The United States also suffers from a captured regulatory body, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There is little doubt among experts that a Fukushima sized crisis could occur in the United States given that reactor designs and safety provisions are similar. Neither nation adequately addresses the problem of low probability, but extreme accidents--the so-called "black swan". US safety regulations are based on design parameters, and do not adequately address accidents beyond ones reactors are designed to withstand, an example being "station blackout" or when a plant loses both grid and emergency power to operate cooling systems. This is exactly what happened at Fukushima when the tsunami flooded underground emergency diesel generators. The NRC has a history of complacency. Nearly ten years after the terror attacks, US nuclear plant owners have yet to complete security upgrades mandated by the agency because of granted time extensions. The Union of Concerned Scientists has issued 23 recommendations to insure nuclear safety and security in the United States.  Commissioners would be well advised to consider their adoption, now.

Congress is currently considering new subsidies for nuclear power. One of those subsidies is for the design of smaller (~500MW), modular design reactors touted as the solution to the prohibitive capital cost of nuclear power. Modular design does not solve the inherent problems of artificial nuclear power: complexity, lengthy lead times due in part to regulation, permanent waste disposal, and radioactive fuel lethality. Contrary to rumor, US Person is not anti-nuclear any more than he is bad for business, however he does not think more nuclear power plants should be built until the current fleet is upgraded or decommissioned. If in the future more nuclear generation capacity is a necessity, then what is needed now is certified design, not modular. By certified design he means one, two or perhaps three types of plants whose design is complete and certified for operation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A utility wanting to build a nuclear plant using one of these pre-approved designs in the United States would experience a much shorter path to licensing. Variations or modifications from the approved design would, of course, be subject to regulatory review. Small, practical modifications not affecting safety or design integrity could perhaps be approved on-site by a government engineer-inspector. As new technologies become available and proven, the certified designs could be updated or replaced. Risk of catastrophic failure in these circumstances would be rightly shared between the public and private enterprise.