Monday, October 15, 2007

Haditha Massacre--And Then There Were None

The Haditha Massacre which took place on November 19, 2005 forces one to recall another infamous massacre of civilians by U.S. forces that took place during the Vietnam War almost forty years ago. Regrettably the event still seems like yesterday. The impossibly painful memory of what happened in the village of Son My on March 16, 1968 is apparently still fresh in the minds of military officers too, who sent their new charges into combat in Iraq with the admonition, "no more My Lais," referring to the military designation of the hamlet the grunts called "Pinkville". The exact number of Vietnamese killed is unknown but the investigating general officer estimated 175 to 400 were killed. It is worth quoting from the letter of draftee Ron Ridenhour in order to understand magnitude of the slaughter. His unsolicited statement a year later forced General Westmoreland to order another investigation of the atrocity:

One village area was particularly troublesome and seemed to be infested with booby traps and enemy soldiers...It was a notorious area and the men of Task Force Barker had a special name for it: they called it "Pinkville." One morning in the latter part of March, Task Force Barker moved out from its firebase headed for "Pinkville." Its mission: destroy the trouble spot and all of its inhabitants. ...The other two companies that made up the task force cordoned off the village so that "Charlie" Company could move through to destroy the structures and kill the inhabitants. Any villagers who ran from Charlie Company were stopped by the encircling companies. I asked [Gruver] several times if all the people were killed. He said that he thought they were men, women and children. ...It was so bad, Gruver said, that one of the men in his squad shot himself in the foot in order to be medivaced out of the area so that he would not have to participate in the slaughter. Although he had not seen it, Gruver had been told by people he considered trustworthy that one of the company's officers, 2nd Lieutenant Kally (this spelling may be incorrect) had rounded up several groups of villagers (each group consisting of a minimum of 20 persons of both sexes and all ages). According to the story, Kally then machine-gunned each group. Gruver estimated that the population of the village had been 300 to 400 people and that very few, if any, escaped.

The killing of unarmed civilians by supposedly well trained U.S. combat soldiers aware of the rules of war regarding noncombatants is not the only similarity between the killings at Haditha and My Lai (4). The general charged with investigating the slaughter and subsequent cover up by General Westmoreland, General William R. Peers, recommended courts-martial for twenty eight officers and enlisted personnel including the general in command of the Americal Division. In the end only two officers were tried, Captain Ernest Medina and Lieutenant William Calley. Capitan Medina was acquitted of all specifications. Calley, in command of 1st Platoon, C (Charlie) Company, 1/20th, was convicted of four specifications of premeditated murder. Calley received a life sentence, but he was later pardoned by Nixon.

In the smaller Haditha massacre, five enlisted men were originally charged with participating in the murder of noncombatants. Now only one remains subject to court-martial proceedings for murder, Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich in command of a squad from K (Kilo) Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. According to observers it is unlikely Wuterich will be convicted of anything more than dereliction of duty despite the killing of 15 noncombatant Iraqis, including women and children. Time reports that prosecutors in the Haditha case have struggled to collect evidence, especially evidence relevant to the issue of intent to murder the victims. The investigating officer outlined concerns with the available evidence in a previous Haditha report made public in July recommending charges against Lance Cpl. Justin Sharratt be dismissed. Sharratt was a member of Wuterich's squad the day of the killings. He noted Iraqi witnesses had a motive to fabricate their stories because Marine units had paid out cash to other families of those killed. He called the testimony of the victims' families,"unreliable". However, the Marines involved have also changed their story of what happened over time. At first they said the victims were killed by a roadside bomb. Photographs of the scene showed many of the residents were killed by automatic fire at close range. Some were killed in their beds. The investigator's concerns in the past have gone beyond issues of credibility. He also expressed concern with the impact a harsh sentence might have on the morale of Marines.

Lt. General James Mattis's (Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force) rulings have been favorable to the Marine Corps. On August 9, Mattis decided not to bring charges against Sharratt. A similar decision seems forthcoming on charges facing Lance Cpl. Stephen Tatum, a member of Wuterich's squad. The general also dismissed dereliction of duty charges brought against Capt. Lucas McConnell, the company commander who oversaw Wuterich's squad and did not initially investigate the incident. Mattis will also decide whether to move forward with charges against battalion commander Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani. The investigating officer has recommended that Chessani face court martial for dereliction of duty and other charges. Three senior officers have received only public reprimands for their failure to properly report or investigate the incident. It seems the American military has learned very little in forty years and repeats the same mistake: military cohesiveness maintained despite the fatal cost to civilians caught in the middle of war or further degrading the nation's reputation.